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COMMENTS
that most cases which have held a will ineffective do so not because the
change was attempted by will, but because the will was not in substantial
compliance with the terms of the contract.3 0
The early Illinois decisions followed the strict compliance theory,31
but have accepted substantial compliance when the insured has done all
that was reasonably within his power, and only a ministerial act remains. 2
However, since the Illinois courts hold that the terms and conditions of
the clause are for the protection and convenience of the insurer, the
company, if it does not waive such right by interpleading, can insist upon
strict compliance. 3 As to a will effecting a change, Illinois courts have
allowed the change where the policy expressly provides, 34 but where the
contract said a change other than by provisions in the contract was null
and void, the will was held ineffective. 5
THE NOTARY PUBLIC-A FORGOTTEN POWER
The duties of the notary public are numerous' and well known in our
society, and the exercise of these functions a common occurrence. Yet the
careless and unconcerned way in which these acts are often performed
indicates that many fail to appreciate the seriousness of the notary's func-
tion. It is the purpose of this comment to examine some of the legal re-
sults which flow from the proper or improper performance of the func-
tion of a notary public.
The most common act which the notary performs, and out of which
80Smith v. Smith, 172 F. 2d 399 (C.A. 8th, 1949); Quinlan v. Quinlan, 293 Ky. 565,
i6 9 S.W. zd 617 (1943); Bennett v. Bennett, 70 Ohio App. 187, 45 N.E. 2d 614 (1942);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mallory, 291 Mich. 7oi, 289 N.W. 302 (1939); Nance v. Hil-
liard, 1o F. 2d 957 (C.A. 8th, 1939); cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dinzik, 141
NJ. Eq. 336, 57 A. 2d 287 (Ch., 1948) where a change was attempted by a certified
instrument.
3' Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Williams, 284 Ill. App. 22, 1 N.E. 2d 247 (1936); Equi-
table Life Assurance Society v. Stilley, 271 Ill. App. 283 (1933); Freund v. Freund,
218 111. 189, 75 N.E. 925 (1905); McEldowney v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 IM.
66, 179 N.E. 520 (1931).
32 Young v. American Standard Life Ins. Co., 398 Ill. 565, 76 N.E. zd 5o (1948);
Kavanagh v. New England M.L. Ins. Co., 238 Ill. App. 72 (1925).
38 Kurgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 340 IMl. App. 178, 91 NZE. 2d 620 (1950); Young v.
American Standard Life Ins. Co., 398 Ill. 565, 76 N.E. 2d 501 (1948).
34 Baldwin v. Begley, i85 Ill. i8o, 56 N.E. io65 (igoo).
35 Modem Woodmen of America v. Scott, 201 Ill. App. 144 (1916).
1 The notary public is "a public officer whose function is to administer oaths; to
attest and certify, by his hand and official seal, certain classes of documents in order
to give them credit and authenticity in foreign jurisdictions; to take acknowledge-
ments of deeds and other conveyances, and certify the same; and to perform certain
official acts, chiefly in commercial matters, such as the protesting of notes and bills,
the noting of foreign drafts, and waive protests in cases of loss or damage." Black's
Law Dictionary, p. 1257 ( 3d ed., 1933).
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the major portion of litigation in the field has arisen, is his certification of
acknowledgement of deeds and other instruments relating to real estate.
"The notary's certificate of acknowledgement of a deed is the pillar of
our property rights. All titles depend on official records; and all records
depend on the notary's certificate of acknowledgement. ' 2
In Illinois, deeds, mortgages, or other writings relating to real estate
may be acknowledged before a notary public. This act must be attested
by the notary's official seal,3 and a private seal will not suffice. If properly
authenticated, the certificate is prima facie proof of the execution 4 of the
instrument and of its acknowledgement5 by the maker.
The certificate is also entitled to some weight as tending to show a
delivery of the instrument especially where the certificate recites a
delivery by the grantor, and even more so if the acknowledgement is
made in the grantee's presence." A deed is presumed to have been de-
livered from its date, and the fact that the certificate of acknowledgement
bears a later date is not in itself enough to rebut: that presumption.
7
If, on the other hand, a deed is not acknowledged, it is still valid as a
transfer of title," except as to the homestead estate.9 The deed, if recorded,
will also be deemed notice to subsequent purchasers. When such a deed
is put in evidence, however, its execution must be proved.' 0 This is a
severe handicap, especially in the case of old deeds, and is a problem
which does not occur with acknowledged deeds.
An Illinois statute gives the notary power to administer oaths." The
power is not incidental to his office, but rather dependent on statutory en-
actment,' 2 and even extends to proceedings not commenced before the
notary.13
A notary was formerly required by statute to keep records, but that
2Wigmore, Notaries Who Undermine Our Property System, 22 111. L. Rev. 748,
749 (1928).
3111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 30, 1 9.
4 Curtis v. Curtis, 398 111. 442, 75 N.E. 2d 881 (1947); Houlihan v. Morrissey, 270
i11. 66, 1io N.E. 341 (1915); Spencer v. Razor, 251 M11. 278, 96 N.E. 300 (1910.
5 Lake Erie and Western R. Co. v. Whitham, 155 11. 514, 4o N.E. 1014 (1895).
0 Warrick v. Hull, 102 111. 280 (i882).
-Dunn v. Heasley, 375 111. 43, 30 N.E. 2d 628 (1940).
8 Zilvitis v. Szczudlo, 409 111. 252, 99 N.E. 2d 124 (195).
9 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 52, § 4; Logue v. Von Almen, 379M . 2o8, 40 N.E. 2d 73
(1942); McNichols v. McNichols, 299 111. 362, 132 N.E. 448 (i921); McCreight v.
Pinkerton, 258 111. App. 477 (1930).
1011. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 30, § 30.
11 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 1o, § I.
12 Trevor v. Colgate, 181 Ill. 129, 54 N.E. 909 (x899).
13 In re Roth, 398 Ill. 131, 75 N.E. 2d 278 (j947).
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provision was repealed in 1949.14 Nevertheless, it appears that if such a
record is kept, it will, if duly certified, be competent evidence to prove
the facts stated therein, 15 and can, for example, be prima facie evidence
that payment of a bill of exchange has been demanded and refused and
that notice of dishonor has been given.16 A notary's certificate may also
be used to prove such facts, 17 although a notarial certificate of protest
made by a foreign notary may not."'
Since the notarial act has many important effects, it becomes material
to determine how the notary's certificate can be overcome.
A notary's certificate of acknowledgement can be overcome only by
proof which is clear and convincing,' 9 and the party who seeks to im-
peach the gertificate has the burden of proof.20 The unsupported testi-
mony of the grantor is not sufficient to overcome the certificate,2 1 even
if slightly corroborated. 22 Furthermore, the testimony of a notary who
seeks to impeach his own certificate will be given little weight.23 When
the facts as they appear remove the integrity which ordinarily attaches to
the certificate, such as where the notary testifies that he made an acknowl-
edgement in blank, the certificate loses its sanctity.24
Mere proof that the signature was not the grantor's handwriting does
not overcome the certificate since there might have been an adoption.2 5
The uncontradicted testimony of three disinterested persons that at least
one of them was in attendance of the grantor at all times and that, there-
fore, the purported acknowledgement was never made, was held sufficient
to overcome the certificate. 26 A certificate was of no effect where the
grantor was illiterate and there was no explanation to her of the nature
and legal effect of the document she was signing.27
U4 See Il. Rev. Stat. (95') c. 99, S ii.
15M11. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 99, S 12.
1
6 Montelius v. Charles, 76 IL. 303 (1875).
17 Sublette Exchange Bank v. Fitzgerald, i68 I11. App. ,40 (1912).
18 McAllister v. Smith, 17 Il. 328 (1856); Vaughan v. Potter, 131 11. App. 334 (1907).
19 Koepke v. Schumacher, 406 Ml. 93, 92 N.E. zd 152 (195o); Fangrow v. Buetow,
399 Ill. 127, 77 N.E. zd 39 (948); Spencer v. Razor, 251 Ill. 278, 96 N.E. 300 (1911);
Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 Ill. 378 (1878).
20 Duncan v. Duncan, 203 111. 461, 67 NE. 763 (1903).
21 Stone v. Stone, 407 I. 66, 94 N.E. d 855 (195o); Pfaff v. Petrie, 396 UL. 44, 71
N.E. zd 345 (1947); Moneta v. Hoinacki, 394 Ill. 47, 67 N.E. 2d 2o4 (1946); Finney v.
White, 389 M1. 374, 59 N.E. zd 859 (1945); Herpich v. Williams, 300 I11. 540, 133 N.E.
220 (i921); McReynolds v. Stoats, 228 IIl. 22, 122 N.E. 86o (t919).
22Parlin and Orendorff Co. v. Hutson, 198 II1. 389, 65 N.E. 93 (1902).
23 Union Colliery Co. v. Fishback, 299 II. x65, 132 N.E. 492 (1921).
24 Note 22 supra.
25 Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 Ill. 378 (1878).
26 Lewis v. McGrath, r91 II1. 401, 61 N.E. 135 (1901).
2 7 Zubas v. White, 404 I11. 4oo, 89 N.E. d 46 (t949).
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By way of a general rule it can be said that any acknowledgement taken
before a notary public who is financially interested in the transaction is
a nullity.28
A facet of this problem, which is of vital interest to attorneys, is the
effect of an acknowledgement or taking of an affidavit by an attorney.
Courts once felt that an attorney who made affidavits in a case in which
lie was professionally interested was biased,29 and they frowned upon
such practice.30 Even so, an early case held that the admission in evidence
of a petition sworn to before a notary who was the attorney for the
petitioners did not amount to reversible crror.31 The court, in Ogden
Building and Loan Ass'n v. Mensch, '3 2 remarked by way of dicta, that an
attorney of a party who is beneficially interested in a deed or mortgage, is
not disqualified to certify an acknowledgement in an official capacity.
The fact that a decree allows attorney's fees does not amount to such a
pecuniary interest as would invalidate an affidavit sworn to before him as
a notary by one of the parties.33
There are no recent Illinois cases on the point, but it would seem a fair
assumption that unless actual pecuniary interest of an attorney is proved
he is not disqualified from acting as a notary in a case in which he is pro-
fessionally interested.
An acknowledgement of a deed of trust taken by one of the trustees
thereunder is not valid,34 and the acknowledgement of a chattel mortgage
by one of the nortgagees, a justice of the peace, was held ineffective. 35
It had been held in Illinois that an acknowledgement taken by a stock-
holder of a corporation which was a party to the transaction was not valid,
on the theory that the stockholder was the real party in interest where
corporate matters are concerned. 6 The rule did not apply where the
notary was merely an officer of the corporation. In 1935, an act was
passed which provides that it shall not be an objection to the validity of
any act of a notary that such notary is an officer, stockholder, or em-
ployee of a corporation which is a party to the instrument acknowledged
by such corporation, provided that this notary did not sign the instru-
nent on behalf of the corporation."
-s Logue v. Von Almen, 379 Ill. 2o8, 40 N.E. 2d 73 (1942).
29 Peck v. People, 153 Ill. 454, 4S7, 39 N.E. 117, 118 (1894).
30Linck v. Litchfield, 141 Il. 469, 478, 31 N.E. 123, 125 (1892).
31 Hollenbeck v. Detrick, 62 Ill. 388, 44 N.E. 732 0896).
32 196 Ill. 554, 63 N.E. 1o49 (19o2).
33 McCormick v. Higgins, xgo Ill. App. 241 (x914).
34 Darst v. Gale, 83 Ill. 136 (1876); Russell v. Bosworth, lo6 I11. App. 314 (1902).
.35 Hammers v. Dole, 61 Ill. 307 (1871).
36 Ogden Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Mensch, 196 Ill. 554, 63 N.E. 1049 (19oz).
. IT. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 99, § 14.
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Where an error in a certificate of acknowledgment was clerical, the
Illinois court said it would disregard it or correct it in considering im-
portant rights.38 In that case, the certificate read "the contents and mean-
ing of said husband were ... made known ... " and the court corrected
it to read "deed" instead of "husband." The omission of the notary to
write the words "notary public" after his signature will not render the
certificate invalid where he describes himself as a notary in the body of
the instrument, and it appears he was acting officially.39
A certificate reading "who . . . personally known to me . . . was
held to be a valid acknowledgement, since it was sufficient in substance. 40
It should be noted that the statute requires:
No ... officer shall take the acknowledgement of any person to any deed...
unless the person offering to make such acknowledgement shall be personally
known to him to be the real person who and in whose name such acknowledge-
ment is proposed to be, or shall be proved to be such by a credible witness.41
Violation of this provision has caused comment in the past.4 2 It is well
known that currency exchange notaries in urban areas frequently disre-
gard the requirement, as do notaries in large office buildings.
An acknowledgement of a deed which omitted the name of the county
in the caption, but which had a seal stating the county, has been held
valid. 4' A certificate bearing the notary's seal but on which the name of
the notary is not attached is invalid.44 The fact that a notary writes the
word "clerk" after his name will not vitiate an affidavit. 45
An Illinois statute provides that a notary, before entering on his duties,
must have a memorandum of his appointment and the time when his
office will expire, entered in the office of the county clerk of his county,46
but the statute does not invalidate acts performed by a notary who has
not complied with this provision.47
It is no objection to an acknowledgement taken by a notary in one
county in Illinois that he resides in another county. 4  The statute pro-
vides that once a notary is duly qualified, he has the authority to execute
38 Calumet and Chicago Canal and Dock Co. v. Russell, 68 Ill. 426 (873).
39 Lake Erie and Western R. Co. v. Whithan, 155 Ill. 514, 40 N.E. 1014 (1895).
40Hartshorn v. Dawson, 79 Ill. zo8 (1875).
41 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 30, 2 3.
42 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note z.
43Chiniquy v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 4t 111. 148 (866).
44 Clark v. Wilson, 127 Ill. 449, 19 N.E. 86o (1889).
45 Gaynor v. Hibernia Savings Bank, 68 I11. App. 485 (1896), aff'd 166 Ill. 577, 46
N.E. 1070 (1897).
46111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 99, § 5.
47 Keller v. Anton, 316 111. App. 114, 43 N.E. 2d 69o (942); McCormick v. Higgins,
go Il. App. 241 (1914).
48 Guertin v. Mombleau, 144 Ill. 32, 33 N.E. 49 (1893).
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the duties of his office throughout the state, while he resides in the same
county in which he was appointed.49
The fact that a notary, in his own county, does not authenticate the
jurat with his official seal in an affidavit will not invalidate the instrument
because the court will take judicial notice of the notaries public in the
county in which the court entertains jurisdiction.50
.No Illinois cases could be found in which an attempt was made to hold
a notary liable to one injured by his negligence or fraud. It is manifest,
however, that grave consequences can result from an improper per-
formance of the notary's functions, especially in regard to deeds. A notary
might be held liable for a false certification in the same way as a certified
public accountant.51 In addition, it might be possible to satisfy a judgment
against him out of the bond52 which every notary must obtain.
The notary and his role in society seem to have been neglected for too
long. A serious study of the situation by legislators and lawyers- is in order.
LABOR UNION DISAFFILIATION-PROBLEM OF CON-
TRACT BAR AND CONTRACT ASSUMPTION
In the comparatively unexplored field of labor relations no more track-
less area can be found than that reached when a union local votes to dis-
affiliate in toto from the parent organization or from the international
during the term of a valid, binding collective bargaining agreement. The
effect of such disaffiliation might be felt on future certification proceed-
ings, or on the rights to the benefits and burdens of the existing contract
between the employer and the local. Will the existing contract act as a
bar to certification proceedings for a new representative? If a new local
should be certified, will that local be forced to assume the existing con-
tract, or may it bargain on its own behalf?
Answers to these questions1 serve as a most fertile ground for labor
litigation today.
Basically, the problems of contract bar and of contract assumption are
.closely allied to the relationship of union to employee. That relationship
may be described either as agent-principal or as third party beneficiary.
The National Labor Relations Board, in attempting to decide the contract
49111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 99, S io.
50 Hertig v. People, 159 Il. 237, 42 N.E. 879 (896); Schaefer v. Kienzel, 123 Ill.
430, i S NE. 164 (i888); Dyer v. Flint, 2l 1. 80 (1859).
51 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 4ti (193).
52 111. Rev. Stat. (195t) c. 99 § 4.
1 Limited to those situations where the local disaffiliates in toto. Also limited to the
problem of contract acting as a bar to certification proceedings, and the necessity of
contract assumption by successor union. For a discussion o property rights upon
disaffiliation see 131 ALR 902 (1941).
